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ABSTRACT 
We analyze the implications of decentralization for the incentives of local governments to 
provide productivity enhancing local public goods and extort bribes from local 
entrepreneurs. We show that an increase in the share of locally raised tax revenue left 
with the local government raises its incentives to provide public goods and brings more 
entrepreneurs into the official economy. Corruption, measured by the size of bribes that 
local officials charge entrepreneurs for issuing licenses for operating officially, may 
increase or decrease, depending on the extent to which public goods enhance the 
entrepreneur’s productivity. The tests using cross-sectional country-level data support the 
model’s implications. 
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Decentralization, Corruption, and the Unofficial Economy 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the implications of decentralization for the incentives of local 
governments to provide productivity enhancing local public goods and extort bribes from 
local entrepreneurs. We show that an increase in the share of locally raised tax revenue 
left with the local government raises its incentives to provide productivity-enhancing 
public goods and brings more entrepreneurs into the official economy. Corruption, 
measured by the size of the bribe that local officials charge entrepreneurs for issuing 
licenses for operating officially, may increase or decrease, depending on the extent to 
which public goods enhance productivity of the entrepreneurs. The implications of the 
model are tested using cross-sectional country-level data.   
The literature on decentralization and corruption has grown significantly in the 
last few years.
1 Given that both decentralization and corruption are complex phenomena, 
it is not surprising that different models arrive at opposite conclusions with respect to this 
relationship. The analysis that focuses on the role of interjurisdictional competition 
among the localities suggests that decentralization typically reduces corruption.
2 The 
models that emphasize greater accountability of the politicians to the voters under 
decentralization also imply that decentralization results in lower corruption.
3 However, 
                                                 
1 For a concise survey see Fishman and Gatti (2002). 
2 See Brennan and Buchanan (1980). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also highlight the potential role of 
competition in lowering corruption. However, they also point out that decentralization may exacerbate 
corruption although this is more likely to occur due to decentralization of bureaucratic powers within a 
locality rather than among different localities. 
3 Persson and Tabellini (2000).   4 
corruption can be increased if decentralization results in lower “quality” of the 
bureaucrats being involved in the important government decisions.
4 
We contribute to this literature mainly in two ways. First, while the rest of the 
literature on decentralization and corruption simply assumes that local corruption harms 
the economy, we explicitly model the distortions caused by bribes charged by local 
officials.
5 In certain respects, our model is close to that by Choi and Thum (2005) who 
examine the effect of the presence of the shadow economy option on the amount of 
corruption, but they do not consider any taxes and do not focus on decentralization.  
Second, we model the difference between bribes and taxes with respect to their 
effect on the economy. Taxes imposed by the central government and shared with 
localities depend on the entrepreneur productivity, while bribes charged by local officials 
are lump-sum.
6  We argue that to a large extent the difference between taxation and 
bribes stems from the more limited administrative and technical resources of bribe-takers. 
Due to limited administrative capabilities of corrupt local officials, bribes are imposed in 
a relatively unsophisticated manner. In particular, bribe-takers cannot make bribe 
amounts strongly contingent on the individual characteristics of the entrepreneurs such as 
their productivity.  We assume that bribes serve as a lump-sum entrance fee for operating 
                                                 
4 Tanzi (1996). To a large extent the impact of decentralization on corruption and on other aspects of 
governance depends on what is being decentralized. For example, decentralization of expenditure powers 
may not provide any advantages unless it is accompanied by decentralization of revenue generation. The 
incentives of local bureaucrats are undermined if, on the margin, the official local budget revenues are 
determined largely by the upper level of government rather than the local tax collections. See Zhuravskaya 
(2000), Blanchard and Shleifer (2001), Jin, et al. (2005), Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003), and Litwack 
(2002). 
5 Brueckner (2000) considers decentralization in the presence of corruption, heterogeneous consumers, and 
tax evasion, but his focus is on the implications of these factors for the Tiebout model rather than the 
impact of the degree of decentralization on corruption, unofficial economy size, and provision of local 
public goods in a given locality. Moreover, in Brueckner’s model the amount of corruption, its welfare 
costs, and tax evasion are exogenous. 
6 The issue of the difference between taxation and bribes is addressed was Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who 
argued that much of this difference is due to secrecy that accompanies bribes.   5 
in the official sector. Taxation, on the other hand, is proportional to the taxpayer’s 
productivity.
7 We will discuss this assumption in greater detail in the next section. 
More specifically, in our model, the entrepreneurs operating in the official sector 
are taxed by the central government and also may have to pay bribes to the local 
government. Given this tax and bribe burden, the entrepreneurs have incentives to shift 
their activities underground.  In order to induce them to stay in the official sector, the 
local government provides the officially operating entrepreneurs with a public good that 
cannot be fully accessed by the underground entrepreneurs.
8 Lump-sum bribes are 
distortive because they push some entrepreneurs underground, limiting their ability to use 
the public good while also reducing the resources available for the provision of public 
goods. Taxes, on the other hand, are contingent on the entrepreneur’s profit, and if set in 
a reasonable way, can keep all entrepreneurs above ground. The resources for the 
provision of public goods by the local government come from its share of the central 
government’s tax revenue but may also come in part from bribes. This treatment is 
consistent with much of the recent literature.
9  We assume that the local government 
maximizes its total revenue net of the expenditures on public goods, thus not 
                                                 
7 This view of the difference between bribes and taxation presumes that the central government’s tax 
agency does not share the information on the entrepreneurs’ productivities with the local officials.  This 
assumption is natural given the competition for revenue between different levels of government and the 
corrupt nature of the local government.  Moreover, this assumption is consistent with the arrangements in 
most market economies. 
8 That is, the public goods we have in mind are not pure but are partly exclusionary. For example, contract 
enforcement by the government for contracts in the unofficial economy is absent or limited. 
9 The assumption that bribe revenue can be used along with taxes for public goods provision as long as 
these public goods enhance local government revenue follows Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), Choi and 
Thum (2005), and Treisman (2006). This assumption does not, of course, imply that bribe revenue is 
indeed used to provide public goods. It would be perfectly consistent with our model if the entire bribe 
revenue and perhaps even part of the tax revenue is consumed by corrupt officials or is stashed away in 
numbered bank accounts.   6 
distinguishing between sources of revenue.
10 The main tradeoff faced by the local 
officials is between the desire to collect bribe revenue and the fact that bribes reduce the 
size of the tax base, shrinking the tax revenue, a share of which accrues to the local 
government. 
The role of the central government in our model is passive.  Both the tax rate and 
tax revenue share transferred to local government are treated as exogenous.
11 The 
behavior of the central government is assumed to be influenced by a number of different 
groups in the economy, including the local governments and the entrepreneurs who 
impose potentially complicated constraints on the behavior of the central government.  
Therefore, instead of modeling these constraints, we examine the comparative statics of 
the local government behavior with respect to the parameters set by the central 
government.
12 
We obtain the following results. First, we demonstrate that corrupt governments 
produce less public good than is socially optimal.  This result is consistent with the 
empirical findings of Djankov, et al. (2002) showing that a high degree of corruption is 
associated with lower provision of public goods, although Djankov, et al. do not model 
the mechanism of underprovision of public goods in the presence of corruption. This 
result is also similar to Choi and Thum (2005).  
                                                 
10 This assumption implies that the central government chooses not to monitor the behavior of local 
authorities, possibly due to lack of resources or the lack of well-developed institutions of accountability. 
11 While we recognize the validity of Treisman’s (2004) argument that the inclusion of central 
government’s behavior can significantly affect the outcomes of decentralization, we think that the activities 
of the central and local governments affect different economic actors. For example, the environment in 
which small businesses operate may not be significantly influenced by the extent of central government 
corruption. Treisman himself recognizes that his neutrality result may not hold when the roles of local and 
central governments become sufficiently asymmetric. Also, his result holds only when taxes and bribes are 
treated symmetrically. Such treatment may not be justified, however, and we treat these two revenue-
raising mechanisms differently.   7 
Second, our model demonstrates that an increase in the share of locally collected 
tax revenue returned to the local government always increases the provision of public 
goods. However, contrary to the common assumption, greater decentralization may or 
may not reduce local government corruption measured by the size of bribes imposed on 
entrepreneurs.  The crucial parameter that determines the comparative statics of 
corruption and public good provision is the elasticity of private payoff with respect to the 
provision of local public good.  This elasticity is difficult to measure, but the modern 
empirical literature suggests that it is quite small.  If this is indeed the case, then our 
model implies that as the share of local government in the official tax revenues increases, 
the degree of corruption, as measured by the size of bribes imposed on the entrepreneurs, 
declines, and the provision of public goods increases.  Therefore, local governments that 
receive a larger proportion of the local tax revenues will tend to be less corrupt and 
provide more public goods.   
Third, we show that even though the effect of greater decentralization on 
corruption is ambiguous, it always increases the size of the official economy relative to 
the unofficial one. 
Finally, we test the predictions of our model with respect to the relationship 
between the degree of decentralization and corruption, the size of unofficial economy, 
and the provision of productivity-enhancing public goods. Such testing is hampered by 
poor data availability and potentially significant endogeneities that are difficult to 
eliminate. Keeping in mind these limitations, the findings based on commonly used 
cross-country data generally confirm our hypotheses.     
                                                                                                                                                 
12 The extension of the present model to optimizing central government leads to similar results However, 
the range of parameters for which the obtained results hold is more restrictive. For the extended model see   8 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and 
derives the comparative statics with respect to the local government’s share of tax 
revenue. Section 3 presents the empirical tests.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider an economy with two levels of government: central and local.  The 
central government imposes a tax on entrepreneurs operating in a jurisdiction of a local 
government and transfers a proportion γ of tax revenue to the local government.  Because 
the focus of the analysis is primarily on the behavior of the local government and because 
the central government is a highly complex organization representing a broad cross-
section of interests, the tax rate and the size of transfers determined by the central 
government are treated as exogenous.  The local government is responsible for the 
provision of local public goods.  It produces public goods according to a twice 
continuously differentiable production function  ) g ( f , f′>0, f′′<0, f′(0)=∞, f′(∞)=0  
where  g is the expenditures on inputs. The price of inputs is treated as exogenous and 
normalized to 1.  The local government is assumed to be able to purchase as much g as it 
desires at a constant price.  
  The number of entrepreneurs in the economy is normalized to 1.  Entrepreneurs 
can choose to operate in the official or unofficial economy.  In the absence of corruption, 
the payoff to an entrepreneur in the official sector is: 
 
) ( ) 1 ( g f y t U i
of
i − =               (1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Habodaszova (2003).   9 
where i y  represents an individual entrepreneur’s exogenous ability.
13 This ability is 
assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0,1].  Alternatively, entrepreneurs can choose to 
operate in the underground economy.  The payoff generated in the unofficial sector is 
specified as: 
) (g f ky U i
un
i = ,              (2) 
 
where  [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ k .  That is, the gross of tax payoff of entrepreneurs in the unofficial sector 
is assumed to be smaller than in the official economy. One reason for k to be less than 1 
is the limited ability of the underground entrepreneurs to use the government-provided 
public good. Also, underground entrepreneurs operate in secrecy and may have to use 
suboptimal technologies in production and delivery of their product.
14 Finally, the lower 
payoff to underground entrepreneurs may reflect the probability of discovery and penalty.      
Given the payoffs in the absence of corruption, all entrepreneurs will choose to 
operate in the official sector  as long as k t > − ) 1 ( .  This inequality is assumed to hold 
throughout the rest of the analysis, because otherwise, both the output and the 
government revenue are zero.  The proportion of entrepreneurs who enter the official 
sector is denoted by N. In the case without corruption N = 1.   
The local government is assumed to maximize its revenue net of the costs of public good 
provision. In addition to the γ share of the tax revenue collected from the entrepreneurs 
within its jurisdiction, the local officials extort informal lump-sum bribe B ≥ 0 from each 
                                                 
13 We do not assume the absence of tax evasion among entrepreneurs who operate officially. Instead, we 
assume that whatever evasion takes place, its final outcome is an effective tax rate of t on the 
entrepreneur’s profit. We could also replace profit taxation with a tax on sales. The important assumption 
here is that the tax amount depends on the entrepreneur’s ability. 
14 The first justification for k < 1 is used by Grossman (1995). The second justification is present in Choi 
and Thum (2005) and Berkowitz and Li (2000).   10 
entrepreneur.  The precise mechanism of corruption is not crucial, as long as the local 
government acts as a monopolist in charging the bribes and providing local public goods.  




B g f y t U i
of
i − − = ) ( ) 1 (             (3) 
 
Notice that this specification assumes that the local officials are unable to “bribe-
discriminate” among entrepreneurs.  This is a reasonable assumption when an 
individual’s productivity is private knowledge.  At the same time, in the above 
specification, tax payment depends on income level suggesting that the central 
government does have information about the entrepreneur’s productivity.  As explained 
earlier, this informational asymmetry between the central and local government arises 
because of the greater administrative resources of the tax authorities compared to bribe 
takers.  It is also assumed that central tax authorities do not share the individuals’ tax and 
income information with local government officials.  Even though the interaction 
between the central and local government is not explicitly modeled, it is plausible to 
expect that the central government will not share tax information, particularly if tax 
information is considered confidential or if local governments are known to be corrupt. 
  The lump-sum nature of the bribe is often used in the literature (e.g., Li, 1996; 
Choi and Thum, 2005), although Svensson (2002) found that bribes in Uganda were 
positively related to firm’s profits. Note, however, that in order for us to obtain our 
                                                 
15 One can argue that local governments may have to compete for entrepreneurs.  If the entrepreneurs are 
mobile, the competition would lower the value of B.  This situation would correspond to the competitive 
corruption outcome in Shleifer and Vishny (1993).  The current analysis is limited to the situation when the   11 
results, we need only that the bribe includes a substantial component that is independent 
of the firm’s profit and that serves as a binding entry fee into the official sector. 
Svensson’s benchmark regression does include such a component. Moreover, the 
adjusted R
2 in Svensson’s benchmark regression was less than 0.2, suggesting that profit 
explained a relatively small proportion of bribe variation.
16 
Entrepreneurs operate in the official sector if the payoff there is larger than the 
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The threshold level of profit that generates higher payoff in the official economy than in 





≥                   (5) 
 
where  0 1 > − − = k t δ .  The value of δ represents the surplus or advantage from 
operating in the official sector compared to the unofficial sector in the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
entrepreneurs’ ability to move to a different locality is restricted.  In fact, the differences in the degree of 
mobility of entrepreneurs can explain why corruption arises in some regions and not in others. 
16 Svensson’s results are consistent with our assumption of limited information that the corrupt officials 
have with respect to the firm’s profitability. For example, let the official in our model know only whether 
the entrepreneur’s ability is in the [0,c] interval or in the [d,1] interval, where c<1 and d>0. Then while the 
bribe would differ between the groups of entrepreneurs, it would be independent of the specific yi and at 
least for the entrepreneurs with yi∈[0,c] the bribe would preclude some of them from operating in the 
official economy. Because the bribe depends on the group to which an entrepreneur belongs, a regression 
of bribe amounts on profitability may generate a statistically significant coefficient albeit with a relatively 
low R
2. Nonetheless, out results would remain qualitatively the same, but they would have to be restated 
for yi∈[0,c] instead of yi∈[0,1].   12 
bribes.
17  Given the distribution of y, the size of the official sector, measured as a 
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Naturally, all else equal, the percentage of entrepreneurs in the official sector is 
negatively related to the size of the bribe they have to pay and positively related to the 
provision of public goods.   
Given our assumption of revenue-maximizing local government, its problem is:  
 
g BN dy ) g ( f y t L Max i




− + ∫ =
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δ
γ ,          (7)  
where N is defined in (6). The first term in (7) represents the proportion of tax revenue 
left with the local government, the second term is revenue from bribe collection and the 
third term reflects the cost of inputs used for the provision of the public good.  In other 
words, we assume that from the point of view of corrupt local officials, bribe revenue is 
equivalent to tax revenue. While this is not an unusual assumption (see Treisman, 2006), 
one might argue that it is somewhat extreme as bribe revenue is probably easier to divert 
                                                 
17 One might argue that if our model included the central government in a meaningful way, it would be 
interested in eliminating corruption at the local government level by setting δ = 0 or k = (1 - t).  However, 
the center may not find elimination of corruption desirable. First, if k is small, the tax rate would have to be 
excessively high and hence politically infeasible in most countries.  Second, the entrepreneurs’ as a group 
may obtain a larger payoff at lower t, even if they have to pay bribes. A central government that is 
influenced by entrepreneurs and that cannot costlessly redistribute income may not want to set tax rates 
sufficiently high to eliminate corruption. Third, the central government may be subject to pressures from 
local governments not to raise taxes, particularly if γ is relatively low. Fourth, high tax rates may be too 
costly to enforce. Recall that in our model, t represents the effective tax rate that incorporates possible tax 
evasion and tax avoidance.  
   13 
to the official’s personal consumption than tax revenue. Note, however, that in order to 
account for this difference, we would simply need to lower the weight on the first term in 
L. Technically, this adjustment is equivalent simply to lowering γ and, therefore, it does 
not affect our comparative statics results.  
While in our model the central government is passive, its actions can potentially 
be important for the behavior of the local officials. A crucial parameter that is determined 
largely by the central government is the extent of revenue-sharing or fiscal 
decentralization that we parameterize by γ. As we discussed in the introduction, the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on the local government has been a subject of lively 
debate in the recent literature, although most of it concentrates on the link between 
decentralization and corruption. The following proposition confirms that even in our 
simple model decentralization may affect the degree of local corruption either positively 
or negatively, and adds implications of fiscal decentralization for the amount of local 
public goods and for the size of unofficial economy. 
Proposition 1: The solution to problem (7) exists and is unique. Comparative 
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.    14 
Proof. Given the properties of f(g), the existence and uniqueness of the solution to 
(7) is established in a straightforward manner by showing that the first order conditions 
for (7) yield a unique solution and that the second-order conditions are satisfied. The 
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where f denotes f(g). The second order conditions are straightforward but cumbersome 
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In order to demonstrate (i), we implicitly differentiate f′ in (10) with respect to γ and 









) t ( ' ' f





Similarly,  we can establish that 


























The sign of the above expression depends on the elasticity of f(g) with respect to g, 
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For example, if f(g)=g























otherwise. Finally, the sign of 
γ ∂
∂ * N
is easily established by implicit 






derived above. Q.E.D. 
All of these results are consistent with intuition. Consider first the positive effect 
of γ on g*. Other things being equal, higher γ  implies that the marginal revenue of the 
local government from providing public good becomes greater and, therefore, the local 
government procures more inputs for public good provision. Larger public good 
provision increases income of entrepreneurs in both official and unofficial sectors.  In 
addition, some entrepreneurs in the unofficial economy will find it beneficial to shift to 
the official economy, because restricted access to public goods in the unofficial economy 
becomes more punitive with the increasing size of the public good provision.  The 
resulting increased tax base magnifies the benefits from the increase in the share of tax 
revenue received by local government.     
Along with the adjustment of the public good provision as a result of a change in 
γ , the government adjusts the optimal size of the bribe, B*.  The local government’s cost 
of bribery in this model is the flight of entrepreneurs to the unofficial economy.  
Therefore, since the local government’s interest in local official output increases with its 
share of tax revenue, local officials have an incentive to reduce the size of the bribe and 
bring more entrepreneurs into the official sector. However, increased provision of public 
goods increases also income of entrepreneurs in the official sector and thus increases the 
opportunities for extortion from them. Which effect dominates depends on the elasticity   16 
of entrepreneur’s payoff with respect to public goods, ε=gf′/f. When ε is low, an increase 
in the public good provision produces a relatively small increase in entrepreneurs’ 
incomes that may be insufficient to induce entrepreneurs working in the official sector to 
tolerate higher bribes.  As a result, the government’s incentive to lower the bribe in order 
to enhance the attractiveness of the official sector dominates.   
When ε is large and γ increases, the size of the bribe increases.  This is because an 
increase in income of entrepreneurs from the higher provision of public good is 
sufficiently large so that local government officials can increase the bribe without 
sending entrepreneurs to the unofficial economy.  Entrepreneurs facing an increase in the 
bribe that would otherwise drive them to the underground economy are sufficiently 
compensated by the increase in their level of income from the public good provision to 
stay in the official economy. 
Independent of the impact of γ on the size of the bribe, a larger γ  unambiguously 
increases the size of the official sector. This is a particularly interesting result in that it 
allows for a possible simultaneous increase in corruption measured by the size of the 
bribe and an increase in public good provision and the reduction in the relative size of 
unofficial economy. Given that the effect of γ on the size of the bribe, B, depends on the 
value of ε, it is worthwhile to examine comparative statics of the threshold value of ε in 
the framework of a particularly simple example where f(g)=g
β . In this case, ε=β and the 
threshold value is given by







≡ . That is, the equilibrium bribe B* increases in 
γ if β>β0, and B* decreases in γ otherwise. It is readily seen that this threshold increases 
in t, γ and k. An increase in either the tax rate or the share of taxes left with the local   17 
government strengthen local government’s interest in developing the local tax base.  
Therefore, a larger value of β is required for the incentives to charge higher bribes to 
dominate over the incentives to promote the local tax base.  Similarly, a larger value of k 
implies a lower cost for entrepreneurs to operate in the unofficial sector, making it more 
difficult for the local government to lure entrepreneurs above ground.  When the value of 
k is relatively high, a high value of β is necessary to make it possible for the local 
government to attract entrepreneurs above ground and increase the bribe at the same time.   
Welfare of all active agents in this model increases in γ. Indeed, suppose γ 
increases from some initial level of γ0 to γ0+∆. Local government can assure a greater 
than the initial level of welfare for itself by changing neither its bribe size nor the 
provision of public goods. Therefore, it should be able to achieve at least the same level 
of welfare by adjusting its bribe and public good provision optimally. A similar revealed 
preference argument combined with the fact that an increase in γ leads to an increased 
provision of public goods demonstrates that those agents who were in the underground 
economy when γ = γ0 would also benefit from higher γ. Welfare gain for the 
entrepreneurs operating in the official economy can be derived by a rather 
straightforward but somewhat tedious analysis of the derivative of their payoff,  
(1-t)yif(g)−B, with respect to γ, utilizing (10) and keeping in mind that for those 
entrepreneurs (5) holds. These results are not particularly interesting, however, because 
they do not reflect the effect of changing γ on central government and the public good 
that it provides. (Recall that central government is passive in our model.) Depending on 
the central government’s costs of providing public goods and their impact on welfare of 
other agents, welfare outcomes can be different. Note, however, that for some values of   18 
parameters, central government revenue increases in γ even though its share of tax 
revenue declines. This can occur because greater γ increases N and g that lead to higher 
total tax revenue. Depending on the elasticity of total tax revenue with respect to γ, an 
increase in γ can lead to either an increase or a decrease in central government’s tax 
revenue. 
 
3. A test of the model’s implications 
  The analysis of the previous section provides two predictions that are 
independent of the value of elasticity, ε, of public good impact on the entrepreneurs 
payoff. Both the provision of productivity-enhancing local public goods and the size of 
the official sector of the local economy increase in the share of taxes left at the disposal 
of local government.
18    
In addition, depending on the value of ε, corruption as measured by the bribe size 
may either increase or decrease in γ. The value of ε is mainly an empirical issue.  In a 
summary of previous empirical studies Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) report that elasticity 
of output with respect to expenditure on public goods falls in the range between 0 and 
0.4.  Similarly, Lynde and Richmond (1993) find that the estimated average value of 
elasticity of output with respect to public capital input is 0.2. The studies concentrate on 
the estimation of the importance of infrastructure for the productivity of the private 
                                                 
18 We stress that our model examines the provision of local public goods rather than all public goods. As 
Freinkman and Yossifov (1999) point out, the empirical evidence of the link between decentralization and 
growth (and, therefore, presumably growth-enhancing public goods) is mixed. This might be a consequence 
of the phenomenon analyzed by Treisman whereby greater decentralization increases the provision of local 
public goods but decreases the supply of nationwide public goods, resulting in an ambiguous effect on 
overall growth. Our model’s prediction with respect to the unofficial economy, however, is likely to hold, 
because in most countries the unofficial sector consists primarily of small businesses that are affected   19 
sector.  In addition, output elasticity with respect to infrastructure capital at the local level 
is shown to be smaller than at the more aggregate level.
19   These findings suggest that 
the impact of local public goods on private sector output is not particularly large, 
implying that coefficient ε is likely to be small. Therefore, in the empirically relevant 
cases, corruption is predicted to decline in γ.  
We will now attempt to test all three predictions of the model using cross-country 
data. Obviously, our main variables of interest can be measured only very approximately. 
Therefore, the results below should be treated with considerable caution. We note, 
however, that the measures we employ have been extensively used in the literature 
despite their apparent shortcomings. Below, we provide a brief review of the data. A 
more detailed discussion of the data on decentralization is available in Fishman and Gatti 
(2002) and de Mello and Barenstein (2001) as well as on the World Bank (2006) website. 
The former two papers also review various corruption indicators. To measure the size of 
the unofficial economy we use the most comprehensive recent estimates by Schneider 
(2005). This is the only set of estimates that has a sufficient number of cross-country 
observations to permit more or less reliable inferences for our data. The governance 
indicators we use are detailed in Kaufmann et al. (2005). All our variables and sources 
for them are summarized in Table 1 of the Appendix.  
  Our main independent variable is γ. We use the average share of subnational tax 
revenue for 1980-2000 from World Bank (2006) as a proxy for this variable. Our use of 
average for a period of years rather than for a given year follows Fishman and Gatti and 
                                                                                                                                                 
mainly by local rather than nationwide public goods. Campos (1997) argues that this is indeed the case in 
developing countries although perhaps not in the economies in transition. 
19 This result is primarily attributed to the possible spillover effect of the public sector capital that is smaller 
with smaller level of aggregation, see Holtz-Eakin (1994).   20 
de Mello and Barenstein’s approaches and is motivated by the need to increase the 
number of observations and the fact that these shares tend to remain relatively stable over 
time. For the sake of consistency, we also use averages of other variables, generally for 
the 1990-2000 period, if such data are available. (We average governance indicators only 
for years 1996, 1998, and 2000, as these are the only data reported in Kaufmann et al., for 
year 2000 and earlier.)  The use of averages does not affect our qualitative results, except 
when it significantly increases the number of observations, as is the case for subnational 
tax revenues and share of expenditures on public order.  
The effect of subnational tax revenue on the incentives of local government 
might, of course, be modified by the upper level government’s policy with respect to 
transfers. For example, if changes in transfers tend to offset changes in local tax revenue, 
local officials would not be interested in developing local tax base (see Zhuravskaya, 
2000, and Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, 2003). On the other hand, if transfers have the 
nature of matching grants, they can promote incentives for local tax base growth. In 
addition, lumping together revenues of different level of subnational government also 
makes inference difficult. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient information to resolve 
these issues for most countries.  
  There are several different measures of corruption, all of which are highly 
correlated with each other. We choose the measure from Kaufmann et al. (2005) as a 
proxy for B.  
  Perhaps the most difficult variable to measure is the amount of locally provided 
productivity-enhancing public goods. To the best of our knowledge, no commonly 
accepted measure exists even for all productivity-enhancing public goods, to say nothing   21 
of their locally provided share. We chose as a proxy for one kind of such public goods the 
share of subnational budgets devoted to the provision of public order and safety from 
World Bank (2006). Obviously, this indicator suffers from many shortcomings for our 
purposes. First, public order and safety is but one of productivity-enhancing public 
goods. At the same time, some of public order and safety expenditures may not enhance 
productivity. Moreover, high share of these expenditures may be an indicator of high 
crime rates rather than high commitment on the part of local government to maintain 
order. Also, local expenditures on this public good might be affected by the fact that in 
some countries a considerable share of expenditures on public order and safety comes 
from the central budget. Nonetheless, this category of local government expenditure 
appears to be more relevant to enhancing productivity of local entrepreneurs than 
expenditures on defense, recreation, or general public expenditures. It is harder to argue 
that public order and safety is more productivity-enhancing than expenditures on 
transportation and communications or on education. These latter types of expenditures, 
however, appear to be either more consumer-oriented rather than entrepreneur-oriented or 
a large share of this type of expenditures usually comes from the central government, 
making it difficult to evaluate the role of the local government in providing these public 
goods. Also, the focus of our model is on the type of public goods to which underground 
entrepreneurs do not have as much access compared to those who operate legally. Public 
order appears to be the best candidate out of the types of expenditures, for which the data 
are available. 
  With respect to our control variables, in the corruption regression we largely 
follow Fishman and Gatti’s (2002) basic specification in using logarithm of per capita   22 
purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP and the size of government.
20 Unlike Fishman and 
Gatti, we use Voice and Accountability instead of Civil Liberties to control for the 
possibility of political checks on the behavior of local officials. Voice and Accountability 
is intended as an aggregate measure of the degree to which the country’s citizens are able 
to affect the selection of government officials and as such it includes indicators of civil 
liberties (Kaufman et al., 2005, p. 130). Also, our sample size is larger than Fishman and 
Gatti’s, mainly because it includes several former Soviet republics. Because of this, we 
include a dummy variable, FSU, for the former Soviet Union. The use of this dummy 
does not produce qualitative changes in our estimates. We will comment on some 
additional variables when we discuss the results of specific regressions. The descriptive 
statistics for our sample of countries is presented in Table 2. 
  In the regressions where corruption is a dependent variable, the share of 
subnational tax revenue may be influenced by the dependent variable.
21 Following 
Fishman and Gatti (2003) we tried to alleviate this problem by instrumenting subnational 
tax revenue share by five legal origin dummies for English Common Law, French 
Commercial Code, German Commercial Code, Scandinavian Commercial Code, and 
Socialist laws as instruments. There are reasons to doubt the validity of these instruments, 
however, because legal origin might influence the quality and traditions of civil service 
institutions in general and the degree of corruption in particular through channels other 
than the degree of decentralization. Also, unlike in Fishman and Gatti, our instrument 
                                                 
20 Fishman and Gatti use logarithms of GDP and population instead of per capita GDP. Both in their 
regressions and in ours, logarithms of GDP and of population have opposite signs and are approximately 
equal by absolute value (they are usually within one standard deviation of each other) suggesting that they 
can be replaced by a logarithm of per capita GDP. 
21 The reverse causality between decentralization and corruption may be due to the desire of corrupt central 
government officials to keep greater control over tax revenues and rent-generating expenditures of overall 
government.   23 
overidentification tests suggest that these instruments are correlated with the regression 
error. We present the instrumental regression results for the sake of comparability, but we 
put more trust in the OLS results. 
  The results of regressions that test the relationship between control of 
corruption and decentralization are presented in Table 3. These regressions are similar to 
Fishman and Gatti’s, one difference being that, in accordance with our model, we use the 
share of subnational revenue instead of the share of subnational expenditures as the main 
explanatory variable. Not surprisingly, our results are largely similar to theirs although 
there are some interesting differences. In Fishman and Gatti’s benchmark regressions, 
both OLS and two-stage, the coefficient of civil liberties is positive albeit not statistically 
significant while in our regressions Voice and Accountability is significant at 1% level.
22 
We think that the statistical significance of Voice and Accountability is quite natural and 
adds to the plausibility of our results. We also add a dummy variable for common law 
legal tradition. While legal origin dummies may not be good instruments for the degree 
of decentralization, the common law dummy is highly significant in the OLS regression. 
Another additional variable that was absent in Fishman and Gatti’s regressions but is 
highly in ours is absolute latitude. We experimented with other specifications of the 
corruption regression and different measures of corruption. Neither changed our main 
results and given that this issue was researched elsewhere, we prefer to concentrate on the 
more novel findings. 
                                                 
22 De Mello and Barenstein argue that civil liberties indicator should be excluded from the corruption 
regression because it is highly correlated with decentralization and because corruption indicators are used 
in its construction. We do not view these arguments as valid with respect to Voice and Accountability in 
our case. The correlation between our measure of decentralization and Voice and Accountability indicator 
is only about 0.24.    24 
We turn next to the impact of decentralization on the provision of local 
productivity-enhancing public goods. Previous research dealt mainly with the relationship 
between fiscal independence of local government and its incentives to provide local 
public goods in general (Zhuravskaya, 2000). The focus on productivity-enhancing public 
goods makes empirical testing so much more difficult. As we mentioned, our choice of 
the share of expenditures on public order and safety in local budgets is dictated in  part by 
feasibility as well as by substantive considerations. Also, we have only 45 observations 
for this variable. Therefore, these tests should be viewed with greater caution than our 
other results.  
The OLS regression with different sets of control variables produces a positive 
and highly statistically significant decentralization coefficient (see Table 4). The only 
other significant factor is the role of all government in the economy that has a negative 
coefficient significant at 5% level. This might occur because as the central government 
grows, it takes on a greater share of expenditures on public order, allowing local 
governments to reduce their share of expenditures in this category. The results do not 
change appreciably when we instrument per capita PPP GDP via latitude and dummy 
variables for European population, East Asia, and Latin America. It does not appear 
likely that there would be reverse causality between the share of public order 
expenditures and decentralization. 
While the effect of decentralization on corruption and certain aspects of the 
relationship between decentralization and the provision of public goods have been 
modeled and tested in several papers that we have referenced above, the impact of the 
local share of tax revenue on the size of unofficial economy has not been well researched   25 
either theoretically or empirically. Our model suggests an unambiguous negative 
relationship here. We begin the empirical investigation of this relationship by running a 
regression with subnational tax revenue, logarithm of per capital GDP, size of 
government and dummy variables for common law tradition and for the former Soviet 
Union as independent variables. In agreement with our model’s prediction, this 
regression yields a negative and statistically significant coefficient for decentralization 
(see the first two regressions in Table 5).  
Note, however, that in our model the relationship between unofficial economy 
and decentralization is not direct, but may work either through lower corruption, i.e., 
entry fee (bribe) B, or through greater provision of public goods, g, or both. An 
interesting empirical issue, therefore, is which transmission channel is more likely to 
operate. Unfortunately, we have only 40 observations with non-missing values for both 
the size of unofficial economy and public order expenditure shares. Therefore, the tests 
employing the latter variable are not particularly reliable. When we replace the share of 
subnational tax revenue in the unofficial economy regressions (3) and (4) in Table 5 with 
the public order expenditure and control of corruption measure, the coefficients of both 
variables are negative, but only control of corruption coefficient is statistically 
significant. This might suggest that decentralization affects the size of unofficial 
economy only via lower bribes but it also may happen simply because of the small 
number of data points. In order to alleviate this problem, we estimate the following 
structural model:  
CORR=a0+a1SNTAX+a2VOICE+a3PCGDP+a4GOV+a5FSU+a6COMLAW+e1  (11) 
ORDER=b0+b1SNTAX+b2VOICE+b3PCGDP+b4GOV+b5FSU+b6COMLAW+e2 (12)   26 
UE=c0+c1CORRP+c2ORDERP+c3PCGDP+c4VOICE+c5FSU+e3,      (13) 
where UE is the logarithm of the size of unofficial economy as a share of GDP in 
percentage terms, SNTAX denotes the average share of subnational tax revenue in total 
tax revenue for 1980-1996 period, CORR stands for control of corruption measure and 
CORRP is its value predicted from (11), VOICE is a measure of voice and accountability, 
PCGDP represents logarithm of per capita PPP GDP, GOV is the size of government 
expenditures relative to GDP, ORDER is the expenditures on public order and safety in 
subnational budgets and ORDERP is its predicted value based on (12), and FSU denotes 
a dummy variable for the former Soviet republics. The exclusion of GOV and COMLAW 
from (13) is based on the fact that neither variable had a statistically significant 
coefficient in regressions (1) and (3) in Table 5. In a sense, we instrument ORDER and 
CORR variables with SNTAX, GOV, and COMLAW, but unlike a conventional IV 
regression, we use the coefficients of the ORDER regression to generate its predicted 
values for all those countries for which the explanatory variables in (12) are available. 
This increases the number of observations in (13) to 70. When we run a conventional IV 
regression, instrumenting CORR and ORDER with SNTAX, GOV, and COMLAW, the 
p-values for both CORR and ORDER in the second stage regression are slightly above 
0.1. If we add SNTAX to (13), its coefficient is not statistically significant but neither are 
any other coefficients in the resulting regression. These results are broadly robust to 
inclusion of absolute latitude in equations (11)-(13), although as regression (6) in Table 5 
shows, the inclusion of latitude increases statistical significance of the ORDERP to 5% 
but decreases the p-value of  CORRP to 0.13 in equation (13).  The results suggest that 
decentralization does indeed reduce the size of unofficial economy and it appears to be   27 
working via both lower corruption and greater provision of productivity-enhancing local 
public goods.  
 
4. Conclusions 
  We examined the effect of decentralization measured by the share of tax revenue 
retained by the local government on the incentives of local officials with respect to the 
provision of local public goods and corruption. The main contributions of our model to 
the literature on decentralization are two-fold. First, while the literature focuses either on 
taxation or on bribes, our model explicitly incorporates both taxes and bribes that are 
imposed on entrepreneurs who operate above ground. At the same time, these 
entrepreneurs have an option of avoiding taxation and bribes by escaping into an 
underground economy, although such escape deprives entrepreneurs of the full benefit of 
local public goods. Our second contribution consists in explicitly modeling the essential 
differentiation between taxes and bribes. Taxes in our model depend on entrepreneur’s 
productivity while bribes function as a lump-sum entry fee into the official economy. 
This distinction is motivated by the greater ability of tax administration to monitor the 
activities of entrepreneurs relative to the monitoring capabilities of local officials. It is 
also consistent with the usual way taxes are modeled in the tax literature and bribes are 
modeled in the literature on corruption. 
  We derive the following main implications from the model. First, both the 
provision of local productivity-enhancing public goods and the relative size of the official 
economy increase in the share of tax revenue left at the disposal of local officials. 
Second, the size of the bribe charged for the entry into the official economy may either   28 
increase of decrease with greater decentralization, depending on the elasticity of the 
contribution of public goods to the entrepreneurs’ payoffs. Given the existing estimates 
of this elasticity, we concluded that bribes are likely to be inversely related to 
decentralization. 
We test the above predictions of the model using cross-sectional country-level 
data. While these tests should be treated with caution due to the difficulties of 
constructing proxies for our variables of interest and limited data availability, the results 
of the tests generally support the model’s predictions. Two empirical results are most 
important. First, decentralization increases the supply of productivity-enhancing local 
public goods and second, decentralization reduces the size of unofficial economy 
working both through lowering corruption and via greater provision of local productivity-
enhancing public goods.   29 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Data Description 
 
Variable  Description and Source 
SNTAX  Average value of subnational government revenue as a percentage of all 
government revenue for 1980-2000. Source: World Bank (2006). 
CORR  Average value of the index of control over corruption for 1996, 1998, and 
2000 (the only years prior to 2001 that are available in this source). The 
index is intended to measure perceptions of corruption defined as the 
exercise of public power for private gain. Higher values indicate lower 
corruption. Range: from -2.5 to 2.5. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2005). 
UE  The average size of unofficial economy as percentage of GDP for years 
1990, 1995, and 2000 (the only years provided in the source). Source: 
Schneider (2005). 
ORDER  Average of subnational governments’ expenditures on public order and 
safety as a percentage of all expenditures of the subnational governments 
during 1980-1996 period. Source: World Bank (2006). 
VOICE  Average value of the Voice and Accountability index for 1996, 1998, and 
2000, intended to reflect the process by which the authorities in the 
country are selected and replaced. This measure is a combination of 
various indicators of the political process, civil liberties, and political 
rights. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2005). 
PCGDP  Logarithm of the average per capita purchasing power parity GDP for 
years 1990-2000. Calculated from 1990-2000 per capita PPP GDP. 
Source: WDI Online (2006). 
GOV  Average value of general government final consumption expenditure in 
years1990-2000 as % of GDP. Source: WDI Online (2006). 
FSU  A dummy variable that equals unity if the country is a former Soviet 
republic and has a value of zero otherwise. 
Legal origin  This dummy variable identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or 
Commercial Code of a given country. Five alternative legal origins are (1) 
English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) German 
Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; and (5) Socialist 
laws. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
COM_LAW  Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for common law countries and 
0 otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Latitude  Absolute latitude of a country scaled between 0 and 1 Source: La Porta et 
al. (1999)   33 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the main variables  
 
Variable  Number of 
observations 
Mean  STD  Minimum  Maximum 
SNTAX  82  15.04  12.39  1.19  52.52 
CORR  82  0.38  1.08  -1.27  2.45 
Unofficial 
Economy 
70  28.53  13.34  7.77  60.97 
ORDER  45  2.99  2.71  0.09  10.85 
VOICE  82  0.37  0.89  -1.39  1.63 
Per capita GDP  82  10,488  9,270  546  38,907 
GOV  82  16.35  4.95  5.29  28.94 
FSU  82  0.12  0.33  0  1 
Latitude  82  0.37  0.21  0.01  0.72 
Common law  82  0.30  0.46  0  1 
 
Notes:  The descriptive statistics for per capita GDP and for the second economy size are 
not in logarithms even though in the regressions logarithms of these values are  
used;  
Only the values of the variables that are actually used in at least one of the  
regressions contribute to the summary statistics in this table. 
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Table 3. Decentralization and control of corruption 
 
Dependent variable: CORR -- Control of corruption index 
  OLS  GMM IV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
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      .004 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses;  
Significance levels for coefficient estimates: *** - 1%; ** - 5%; * - 10%;  
  Constant is not shown; 
H0 for Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions for GMM estimator is 
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation;  
GMM IV – GMM instrumental variables estimates; SNTAX is instrumented with 
legal origin dummy variables; 
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Table 4. Decentralization and expenditures on public order and safety  
 
Dependent variable:   ORDER -- Share of expenditures on public order and safety in  
      subnational budget 
  OLS  GMM IV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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          .811 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses;  
Significance levels for coefficient estimates: *** - 1%; ** - 5%; * - 10%;  
  Constant is not shown; 
GMM IV – GMM instrumental variables estimates; PCGDP is instrumented with 
absolute latitude and dummy variables for (1) European population; (2) Latin America; 
and (3) East Asia; 
H0 for Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions for GMM estimator is 
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
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Table 5. Decentralization and size of unofficial economy  
 
Dependent variable: UE -- Logarithm of unofficial economy as a percentage of GDP 
  OLS  GMM IV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 




           














   














   
























       










































       
Latitude    -.869*** 
(.287) 
  .392 
(.630) 
  -.667* 
(.390) 
  -.649 
(.482) 
No. obs.  70  70  40  40  70  70  40  40 
R




            .158  .512 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; Constant is not shown; 
Significance levels for coefficient estimates: *** - 1%; ** - 5%; * - 10%;  
  CORR (predicted) is based on regression (2) from Table 3; 
ORDER (predicted) is based on regression (4) from Table 4; 
GMM IV – GMM instrumental variables estimates; excluded instruments are 
SNTAX, GOV, and Common law; 
H0 for Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions for GMM estimator is 
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
 